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Chapter 9
Integrating Life Annuities and Long-
Term Care Insurance: Theory, Evidence,
Practice, and Policy
Mark J. Warshawsky, Brenda C. Spillman, and
Christopher M. Murtaugh
The aging of the baby boom generation, the lengthening of life spans, and
the political shift away from government and employer solutions to retire-
ment issues toward individual responsibility have all combined to heighten
concerns about how future retirees will manage and assure their financial
security in old age. This chapter explores two separate financial and insur-
ance instruments—life annuities and long-term care insurance—that we
suggest could address the need for income security and the potential need
for age- and disability-related long-term care. We evaluate reasons why these
currently available products are not widely used and explore limits on cur-
rent markets for both products. It appears that a combination of the two
products has the potential to make them available to a broader range of the
population, with minimal underwriting and at lower cost. We also explore
tax and design issues that may affect the ability to introduce this and other
innovative products.
In what follows, we first examine the current market for life annuities and
long-term care insurance. Next we contrast the economic and conventional
wisdom concerning the optimal use of life annuities, review current trends
in annuitization, and note possible reasons for market failure, particularly
adverse selection. We then describe how an individual’s risk of needing
costly long-term care services represents a substantial threat to his or her
economic wellbeing, explain the current financing of long-term care ser-
vices, and review the literature on why coverage through private long-term
care insurance remains relatively low. In particular we discuss the impact of
medical underwriting on access to long-term care insurance.
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The Market for Life Annuities
A life annuity is an insurance product that pays out a periodic amount for
the life of an individual or the lives of a couple in exchange for a premium
charge. Annuity payments may be either guaranteed (fixed or increasing)
or variable, depending on the contract structure and underlying invest-
ments. Life annuities frequently offer a guaranteed period over which bene-
fits will be paid even if the annuitant does not survive. A life annuity can be
offered through an employer-sponsored retirement plan or as an individual
product, funded either on a pre-tax or after-tax basis. It is also the form of
payment from the U.S. social security system.
Economic and Conventional Wisdom Contrasted
According to the economic theory of life cycle savings, a straight life annuity
should be the cornerstone of financial planning and practice in retirement.
In this context the chief principle governing household saving behavior is
the desire to smooth consumption patterns over an uncertain lifetime,
within the constraints imposed by limited lifetime resources; here life an-
nuities should be used widely (Friedman and Warshawsky, ∞ΩΩ≠). Without
access to life annuities, elderly individuals would need to conserve wealth to
self-insure against the risk of having to reduce consumption in later years,
should their life span turn out to be unexpectedly long. As a result of
husbanding wealth, the consumption path that these individuals can safely
pursue is lower than one afforded by a fairly priced annuity.
The amount of wealth an individual would be prepared to give up in
order to gain access to a life annuity, so as to avoid the constrained self
annuitization strategy, has been calculated by Mitchell, Poterba, Warshaw-
sky, and Brown (hereafter MPWB ∞ΩΩΩ). They employ an expected utility/
dynamic stochastic optimization framework and use reasonable estimates
for market (interest and mortality rates) and preference (risk aversion and
time discount) parameters in their simulations. The results show that indi-
viduals would forgo ≤≠–≥≠ percent of discretionary wealth (that is, wealth
exclusive of the present value of social security benefits) to obtain a life
annuity.
A mystery, then, is why life annuities are not widely recommended by the
financial planning community. Indeed, almost all financial planning soft-
ware programs and websites ignore mortality uncertainty and hence the
possible beneficial use of life annuities. Instead, planners recommend that
households should expect to finance retirement expenditures over a static
life expectancy (or to be conservative, life expectancy plus ∞≠ years; see
Warshawsky and Ameriks, ≤≠≠≠). Professional financial advisors rarely rec-
ommend life annuities to their retiree clients but instead suggest a combina-
200 Warshawsky, Spillman, and Murtaugh
tion of withdrawal rates and investment strategies for asset portfolios to try
to assure adequate income in retirement (Rekenthaler ≤≠≠≠; Jarrett and
Stringfellow ≤≠≠≠).
Current Annuitization Trends
Almost ∂≥ percent of the income flow of the average retired worker age ∏∑
and older in the U.S. currently comes from social security (EBRI ∞ΩΩπ).
These benefits are provided in the form of a joint and survivor inflation-
indexed straight life annuity, that is, an annuity whose benefits cease with
the death of the last surviving member of the elderly household. Already,
the social security annuity payout is being delayed as the normal retirement
age under the system is gradually raised. Moreover, the system’s actuarial
imbalance may necessitate some fairly fundamental changes in the fu-
ture, changes that could include benefit cuts or privatization (see Mitchell,
Myers, and Young ∞ΩΩΩ). These changes would be likely to produce lower
automatic annuity payments at the same time that life expectancies of the
population are projected to rise, thus increasing risk exposure from lifetime
uncertainty.
There have also been significant changes in the employer-sponsored pen-
sion plan environment. Defined benefit plans traditionally provided a life
annuity as the only payment form, but these have been giving way to defined
contribution plans that are much less likely to even offer a life annuity as a
payment option, let alone mandate it as one (Gordon et al. ∞ΩΩπ). Even
defined benefit plans and their cash balance progeny are now increasingly
offering plan participants the choice between a life annuity and other pay-
ment methods such as systematic and lump sum withdrawals.∞
These trends imply that there will be an increased need for the private
market to offer attractive life annuity products in the future. Currently,
however, the market for single premium immediate annuities (SPIAs) is
small and annuitization rates from deferred annuities are quite low. Pre-
mium payments for individual immediate annuities were just under $∫ bil-
lion in ∞ΩΩ∫ with reserves of $∏Ω.∂ billion and ≤.≥ million covered persons
(ACLI ∞ΩΩΩ). Just over ∞∞≤,≠≠≠ new contracts were issued in ∞ΩΩ∫, and there
were ∞.∑ million contracts in force. Marketing statistics show that, in ∞ΩΩ∑,
the average single premium immediate annuity sold in ∞ΩΩ∑ cost $πΩ,∏≠≠
(MPWB ∞ΩΩΩ); most (∑∑ percent) SPIAs were sold to men, and most (π∂
percent) were not part of a tax qualified retirement plan such as an IRA. As
of ∞ΩΩ∏, just over one percent of individual variable deferred annuities were
making periodic payments, presumably in life annuity form; total annual-
ized income to annuitants, $≥∫∞ million, also represented just one percent
of premiums (ACLI ∞ΩΩπ). These low annuitization rates could represent a
growing and still immature market, or they might represent more funda-
mental aversion to the annuity payment form.
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Current Failures in the Private Voluntary Market
Adverse selection figures prominently as a possible explanation for the lack
of popularity of individual life annuities (Friedman and Warshawsky, ∞ΩΩ≠;
MPWB, ∞ΩΩΩ). A recent study (MPWB ∞ΩΩΩ) found that the expected pres-
ent discounted value of annuity payments per dollar of SPIA premium aver-
ages between ∫≠ and ∫∑ cents for an individual with the mortality prospects
of the general population, and between Ω≠ and Ω∂ cents for an individual
with mortality prospects of annuitants. Stated another way, the cost of ad-
verse selection is about ∞≠ cents on the dollar. In addition, there are transac-
tions costs unique to insurance products, covering marketing and sales com-
missions to agents, at about seven cents on the dollar. Together these costs
could discourage purchase of individual life annuities.
Several other factors also may contribute to restraining the market for
individual annuities. One is that the life annuity purchase is irreversible and
irrevocable, so it can be construed as an illiquid investment, resulting in loss
of control for the annuitant. Yet some individuals highly value liquidity and
control, particularly those facing possible long-term care expenses. A sec-
ond issue is that a life annuity does not help finance a bequest motive.
Although the economic literature debates how significant bequest motives
are, for at least some middle and upper income households, they may be a
factor deterring their purchase of a life annuity. A third explanation may be
institutional considerations, including unimaginative marketing by the in-
surance industry, sales incentives that discourage selling immediate an-
nuities, and negative recommendations from financial advisors that may
confuse investors, who are ignorant of the longevity insurance provided by
life annuities. Finally, excluding annuities available through social security
and a few pension systems, life annuities in the United States do not adjust
for inflation.≤ Elderly households are therefore exposed to the risk of uncer-
tain inflation that they might be able to hedge better through other means,
such as asset allocation strategies. All of these reasons may explain why the
U.S. marketplace for annuities remains thin despite what would seem to be a
rise in factors prompting the demand for life annuities.
Current Methods for Financing Long-term Care Services≥
The term long-term care (LTC) represents a broad range of services and
assistance for people with chronic illnesses or disabilities who are unable to
care for themselves over a relatively long period of time. The need for long-
term care services is particularly high among the elderly, especially the ‘‘old-
old’’ (∫∑ or above), and this is a segment of the population projected to
grow rapidly as the baby boom generation ages. LTC services are expensive,
and their cost is increasing more rapidly than that of other goods and
services in the economy, including other health care services.
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In the U.S., federal and state governments currently provide substantial
resources to support households that cannot finance their own long-term
care needs. Some would argue that the existence of this social safety net has
impinged on the growth of private insurance coverage. Nevertheless some
individuals and families do use long-term care insurance policies to finance
their own future needs. Current market mechanisms, however, have certain
drawbacks and there seems to be some resistance to, and a lack of under-
standing among the public about, the need for insurance coverage for long-
term care needs.
Costs of Long-Term Care Services
LTC services include skilled nursing care as well as supportive services such
as assistance with activities of daily living; these can be provided in a person’s
home or in a residential care facility. More than ∂≠ percent of people aged
∏∑+ are expected to spend some time in a nursing home, and almost one in
∞≠ will spend five or more years there before death (Kemper and Murtaugh
∞ΩΩ∞). A larger proportion will need some long-term care, including home
care, in their remaining lifetimes. About ∞π percent of those age ∏∑+ had a
disability requiring some type of human help, yet only ≤Ω percent of these
were in nursing homes in ∞ΩΩ∂ (Spector et al. n.d.). The likelihood of
spending some time in a nursing home at some point during the remainder
of life increases with age, from ≥Ω percent at age ∏∑, to ∑∏ percent at age ∫∑
(Murtaugh et al. ∞ΩΩ∑). Similarly, the probability of needing help with the
‘‘Activities of Daily Living’’ (or ADLs, including bathing, dressing, feeding,
toileting, and transferring) increases with age. People tend to lose their
ADL functions in the opposite order in which they acquired them when
young. For example, only ≥.∑ percent will need help bathing between ages
∏∑ and π∂, but more than ≤≠ percent will need such assistance at age ∫∑
or older.
The average stay in a nursing home among users of all ages is ≤.∂ years
(Murtaugh et al. ∞ΩΩΩ). The expected stay for most is less than one year; but
for ∞∏ percent of users, it is more than five years. Women, whites, those
widowed or never married, and midwesterners are more likely to experi-
ence a stay in a nursing home and have relatively longer expected stays. The
mean number of years of nursin home residence among users declines with
age at first admission, from ≤.∫ years in the ∏∑ to π∂ age group, to ∞.Ω years in
the ∫∑+ age groups. The average lifetime home health care use is just over
≤≠≠ visits. About half of those expected to use home health care will use
fewer than Ω≠ visits during their lifetimes, while ∞≤ percent can expect to use
more than π≥≠ visits (HIAA ∞ΩΩπ).
The cost of long-term care service represents a substantial expenditure
for older individuals and their families. The nature of the care received,
whether at home or in a facility, will clearly influence costs, as will the
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intensity of medical care referred. Individuals who are more dependent, or
who need more skilled care that can normally only be rendered by a medical
professional, will realize greater costs than someone who requires limited
assistance in bathing or dressing. The average annual cost in ∞ΩΩ∑ for a stay
in a nursing home was about $∂≠,≠≠≠; assisted living facilities charge about
$≤∏,≠≠≠ per year; and home care visits cost $∑≠–$∞≠≠, depending on the skill
level of services provided (Warshawsky, Granza, and Madamba ≤≠≠≠).
Figure ∞ compares cost trends for nursing homes, health services, and all
goods and services over the period ∞ΩΩ∑–ΩΩ, drawing on data from the
USBLS (various years). Nursing home services costs have consistently risen
faster than health services and all goods and services, even as the overall
inflation rate in the economy has declined. In particular, nursing home cost
increases exceeded general inflation in the economy by three percentage
points in the latter half of the ∞ΩΩ≠s. At that rate, the real cost of nursing
home care will double over the next ≤≥ years. The rate of cost inflation for
nursing home services does not appear to be influenced by the same factors
that influence the broader category of health services. This may reflect the
importance of HMO penetration and other innovations in health care pro-
duction and financing over this period, that have not yet affected nursing
homes. It may also reflect a change in the population served by nursing
homes from a predominantly long-term population to more of a post-acute
care population.
The cost of a stay in a nursing home varies widely by the area of the
country. As one might expect, urban areas are usually costlier than subur-
ban or rural areas. In ∞ΩΩ∫, a nursing home in New York City, for example,
could cost more than $≤∑≠ a day, for an annual cost of more than $Ω∞,≠≠≠. In
Oklahoma, on the other hand, the cost was closer to $π≠ a day. The cost of
nursing facilities also depends on the level of sophistication and breadth of
the amenities offered. Those with private insurance or substantial assets
appear to purchase more costly long-term care services, as private-pay nurs-
ing home stays are about ≤∑ percent more expensive than stays paid by
Medicaid (Warshawsky, Granza, and Madamba ≤≠≠≠).
A related issue is that life expectancies of American adults have increased
significantly in the last century and are projected to increase further.
Longer life expectancy has meant that increasing numbers of individuals
will survive into what has been called ‘‘old-old’’ age (age ∫∑ or above). In
fact, individuals in this age group will be the fastest growing segment of the
population by the year ≤≠≥≠. This population aging will also contribute to
higher LTC costs in the future. Of course it is not completely clear whether
longer life expectancies are the result of an increase in the age at which
certain diseases present themselves, or the outcome of lower age-specific
death rates among the infirm (Crimmins et al. ∞ΩΩπ). Some researchers now
believe that the older population is healthier than ever, and that the simulta-
neous rate of decline in mortality and disability will continue because these
204 Warshawsky, Spillman, and Murtaugh
Fi
gu
re
 ∞
. M
ed
ic
al
 c
ar
e 
co
st
 in
fl
at
io
n,
 ∞
ΩΩ
∑–
ΩΩ
. S
ou
rc
e:
 W
ar
sh
aw
sk
y,
 G
ra
nz
a,
 a
nd
 M
ad
am
ba
 (
≤≠
≠≠
).
Integrating Annuities and Long-Term Insurance 205
Table 1. Sources of Funding for Long-term Care Expenses (∞ΩΩπ)
Funding Source Nursing Home (%) Home Health Care (%)
Out-of-Pocket ≥∞.∞≠ ≤∞.∏π
Private Insurance ∂.Ω≠ ∞∞.∂∏
Other Private ∞.Ω≠ ∞≤.≠π
Medicare ∞≤.≥≠ ≥Ω.∏≥
Medicaid ∂π.∏≠ ∞∂.∑∑
Other Government ≤.≥≠ ≠.≥∞
Source: Braden et al. (∞ΩΩ∫).
rates are lower in younger cohorts (Manton, Stallard, and Corder ∞ΩΩπa, b).
Nevertheless, those who survive to ‘‘old-old’’ age are much more likely to
need long-term care than those in their ∏≠s, so the growth in the number of
such individuals will continue to inspire demand for TCL services in the
future.
Americans spent almost $∫≥ billion on nursing home services and more
than $≥≤ billion on home health care in ∞ΩΩπ.∂ Table ∞ shows the sources of
funding for these expenditures in percentage terms. Clearly, government
support is significant, but there are several constraints on that support.
One issue is that Medicare is designed to pay for acute and post-acute care
needs. That program covers care in a skilled nursing facility for up to ∞≠≠
days (with a substantial copayment applied after the twentieth day), follow-
ing a hospital stay of at least three days. In aggregate, Medicare pays for
about ∞≤ percent of nursing home expenses. That program also provides
home health care benefits on a part-time or intermittent basis; this entitle-
ment has grown rapidly over time and now pays for ∂≠ percent of aggregate
home health care expenses. Medicare benefits, however, must be medically
oriented; once care is no longer rehabilitative and becomes custodial in
nature, benefits may no longer be payable.∑ Moreover, in ∞ΩΩπ, Medicare
instituted strict limits on payments to home health care agencies and vig-
orously began to pursue instances of fraud and abuse. A prospective pay-
ment system was recently introduced for skilled nursing facilities and home
health care benefits under Medicare, in response to increases in cost and to
fears that Medicare was becoming a long-term care benefit. Future funding
for long-term care from Medicare is also likely to be limited due to fiscal
trends. The Hospital Insurance Trust Fund is projected to be depleted by
≤≠∞∑, and payroll taxes are projected to cover only one-half of its cost π∑
years from now (Social Security Administration, ∞ΩΩΩ).
Medicaid is a joint federal/state health care program for those with low
income and few assets (or those who deplete their assets paying for long-
term care) that currently pays for almost ∑≠ percent of aggregate nursing
home expenses and almost ∞∑ percent of home health care expenses.∏ For
most middle and high income households, however, Medicaid is either un-
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available or undesirable. Few resources are exempt from the eligibility
guidelines, asset transfers are strictly controlled during a look-back period,
spousal protection is somewhat limited, and only participating providers
can be used, which in practice often limits choice.π Neither Medicaid nor
Medicare pays for the room and board segments of expenses incurred in
assisted living facilities. Future funding for long-term care from Medicaid
may come under some pressure due to fiscal trends. Assuming current law
and reasonable demographic and economic projections, growth in Medic-
aid spending will likely outpace growth in tax revenues traditionally devoted
to Medicaid over the next ≥≠ years (Mulvey and Stucki ∞ΩΩ∫).
It is clear from Table ∞ that private insurance currently pays for a small but
important portion of long-term care expenses in the United States. Private-
insurance-paid expenses that are medical in nature are covered by health
insurance (including Medigap); the remainder are covered by private long-
term care insurance, whether purchased individually or through a group
plan.∫ Surveys of insurance companies selling LTC coverage find that the
market is growing and evolving rapidly, but it is still relatively small. Between
∞Ωπ≤, when the product was first introduced, and the end of ∞ΩΩ∏, ∞≤≠
insurance companies had sold almost ∑ million policies; approximately ∫≠
percent of these policies were purchased individually. A different survey
found that terminations were occurring at ∑.∂ percent annual rate, so that
the number of LTC policies outstanding (≤.∫ million in ∞ΩΩ∫) was lower
than the number of policies sold (ACLI ∞ΩΩΩ). The average annual pre-
mium on an individual LTC insurance policy with inflation protection is-
sued to a ∏∑-year-old was $∞,∫≤Ω in ∞ΩΩ∏ (Coronel ∞ΩΩ∫).
This number of outstanding policies translates into a coverage rate for
overall American population of only about ∞ percent. This definition under-
states effective coverage through the private market, however, since the risk
of needing care arises substantially in middle and old age, and most individ-
ual LTC policies are purchased by older people—the average age of buyers
in ∞ΩΩ∏ was ∏π (Coronel ∞ΩΩ∫). If the coverage rate is limited to people age
∏∑ and older, then about ∫ percent of older individuals are covered by
private long-term care insurance. This coverage rate also differs substan-
tially by state: north and midwestern states with sparse and relatively old
populations, like Montana, North and South Dakota, and Iowa, have much
higher private LTC insurance penetration than some southern and north-
eastern states (Coronel ∞ΩΩ∫). Alabama, where income is low, and New York,
where Medicaid benefits are relatively generous, have low private LTC insur-
ance penetration.
Private LTC coverage rates can also be computed from national surveys—
including the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old Study (AHEAD)
and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) (Sloan and Norton, ∞ΩΩπ). In
∞ΩΩ≥ the AHEAD interviewed a national sample of community-based indi-
viduals aged π≠ and over and their spouses of any age, whereas the ∞ΩΩ≤ HRS
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surveyed a national cohort of individuals aged ∑∞ to ∏∞. In the AHEAD and
HRS respectively, ≤.≤ and ∞.∏ percent of persons had private LTC insurance.
Clearly, these coverage rates are much lower than those reported from in-
surance company sources; the difference may be due to the growth of the
private market over time, or to reporting errors.
Thus far, most LTC policies have been sold to individuals, but of late there
is growing interest and activity in sales through employer-sponsored group
plans. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (∞ΩΩ∫), almost ≥
million workers (π percent of the relevant workforce) were eligible to par-
ticipate in group LTC plans sponsored by medium and large private estab-
lishments in ∞ΩΩπ; only ≤.∞ million workers in medium and large firms had
been eligible as of ∞ΩΩ∑. As of ∞ΩΩ∏, almost ∏≠≠ thousand workers (∞.∑
percent of the relevant workforce) were eligible to participate in group LTC
plans sponsored by small private establishments; only ≤≠≠ thousand workers
in small firms were eligible as of ∞ΩΩ∂. A survey of employers with between
∞,≠≠≠ and ∑,≠≠≠ employees accounted for the largest percentage of firms
sponsoring this benefit (∂≠ percent); the majority of sponsoring employers
offered a voluntary, employee-pay-all LTC insurance benefit (∫≠ percent)
(McSweeney and Aarhus ∞ΩΩΩ). In addition to private sponsors, many state
and local governments sponsor group LTC plans for their public workers. In
particular, California and Alaska have very successful, carefully designed,
and strongly promoted programs; the Alaska plan is totally integrated with
retirement planning and is available to employees at retirement without
underwriting (Pincus ≤≠≠≠). It should be noted that eligibility numbers for
group plans mask much lower participation rates. Nearly three-quarters of
employers sponsoring group LTC insurance had participation rates under
∞≠ percent, with the majority of those having participation rates under ∑
percent (McSweeney and Aarhus ∞ΩΩΩ). The average age of a purchaser of
LTC insurance through a group plan is ∂≥ (Coronel ∞ΩΩ∫).
The advantages of group LTC plans include lower administrative costs for
large employers, convenience to employees, and guaranteed issuance, yet
there are business considerations and risks that may also discourage em-
ployers from establishing such plans. One reason is that young employees
may not appreciate such a program in the absence of a strong educational
effort by the employer. Given that one of the main business reasons for
sponsoring employee benefit programs is their attractiveness to workers,
especially prospective ones, most employers will tend to devote their atten-
tion to benefits areas better appreciated, such as health insurance and child
care benefits. Another reason for reluctance is that employers avoid creat-
ing a new employee entitlement program, especially one involving long
range health care costs that could add unknown costs and liabilities in the
distant future. Finally, employers tend to avoid sponsoring programs that, in
the future, may be burdened by government regulations that could increase
costs or limit flexibility.
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Could increased ownership of long-term care insurance by the general
population help to finance future long-term care expenditures? A recent
study by Mulvey and Stucki (∞ΩΩ∫) uses a large-scale simulation model and
concludes that increased ownership could cut future Medicaid nursing
home expenditures by ≤∞ percent and reduce out-of-pocket expenditures
for nursing home care by ∂≠ percent. The key assumptions of this model are
that everyone age ≥∑ and older in the year ≤≠≠≠ who can afford to purchase
a long-term care policy will do so, and that three-fourths of the purchasers
will retain their policy until old age. Realization of these assumptions would
evidently require a major change in behavior among consumers; as men-
tioned above, at most eight percent of the current elderly have private LTC,
and even fewer younger individuals have coverage. There would also need
to be great public trust placed in the long-term financial capability of in-
surers, and a strong belief that government and social insurance programs
will not be forthcoming in the future to cover long-term care needs. The
main advantages to the purchase of LTC at younger ages are lower annual
premiums and fewer underwriting problems; about three-quarters of the
individuals age ≥∑ to ∂∂ could afford a policy if they spent ≤ percent or less of
their income on private insurance, and if a policy were available to nearly all
individuals in that age grouping. It is unclear whether younger individuals
would be willing to incur such a significant expenditure to insure against a
risk that is so abstract and distant at that age.
Possible Reasons for the Small Market for Private LTC Insurance
Marketing and policy analysts tend to explain the relatively small penetra-
tion of private long-term care insurance (small as compared to other types
of insurance and employee benefits) by appealing to consumer irrationality
and ignorance. In particular, ‘‘behavioral’’ arguments are invoked to ex-
plain peoples’ tendency to ignore low probability, high-loss events that may
occur in the distant future. Some note that people are confused about
whether Medicare covers nursing home expenses, while others point to
factors traditionally used in explaining lack of demand for, or supply of,
insurance, that is, moral hazard and adverse selection. The economic litera-
ture, by contrast, attempts to explain the small penetration of long-term
care insurance among the population by examining fundamental prefer-
ence and incentive issues. Pauly’s (∞ΩΩ≠) analysis launched this literature by
setting up a rational framework of expected utility maximization for a risk-
averse individual with no bequest motive. This consumer is seen as having a
pool of assets to finance consumption and to cover a large but uncertain and
random cost of chronic illness, over a future of unknown length and health.
If perfect insurance markets were available, Pauly shows that the consumer
would use his entire wealth to purchase a life annuity that financed an
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optimal stream of consumption when well, and paid for the cost of chronic
illness when sick. This plan of action is precisely what would be provided
with an integrated life annuity and long-term care insurance policy. If such
an annuity were not available, an older American could still be assured that
the U.S. Medicaid program would provide him with care after nursing home
expenses exhausted his wealth. Hence, he would not buy fairly priced long-
term care insurance.Ω
While this model offers one rationale for the absence of a correctly de-
signed annuity with a LTC insurance component, others have noted instead
the limitations in currently available LTC insurance policies (Cutler ∞ΩΩ≥;
Cohen ∞ΩΩ∫). That is, LTC insurance tends to adopt the classic indemnity
approach, covering only eligible expenses for specified services. This means
that even currently well designed policies can become outdated quickly. For
this reason, a disability approach might be preferred: income benefits are
paid on clear diagnosis of a disability, regardless of the exact nature and
amount of the expenses incurred and services selected. Another reasonable
explanation for the thin private LTC insurance market is people’s desire for
control, flexibility, and liquidity. Older households are often concerned
about family emergencies, personal contingencies, and other uninsurable
and unhedgeable events that might require access to a pool of liquid assets.
However LTC purchase is irrevocable and also carries a load for marketing,
administrative, and underwriting expenses. Hence, for many households,
LTC insurance might not be desired.∞≠
Another explanation for lack of LTC coverage among the elderly popula-
tion arises when medical underwriting indicates that the individual has an
elevated risk of needing care and refuses to sell the policy. This phenome-
non may explain a significant part of the lack of private coverage, given
current purchase patterns. Given underwriting criteria typically used by
insurance companies, between ∞≤ and ≤≥ percent of the elderly population
would probably be rejected for private LTC insurance for health reasons if
everyone applied at age ∏∑ (Murtaugh et al. ∞ΩΩ∑). According to these same
criteria, between ≤≠ and ≥∞ percent would likely be rejected by age π∑.
Although some insurers are now offering risk-rated premiums, underwrit-
ing remains a substantial impediment to the expansion of private LTC
insurance coverage with an average decline rate of ≤≠ percent (Collett
et al. ∞ΩΩΩ).
Additional reasons for the lack of LTC coverage might include ignorance,
discomfort, and dissonance. Recent surveys suggest that older Americans
believe obtaining long-term care poses a significant risk to their standard of
living in retirement, and most believe that they could not afford to stay in a
nursing home for a substantial length of time. It may be that a massive
educational effort on this subject is required to increase consumer knowl-
edge and understanding.∞∞
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Integrating a Life Annuity and Long-Term Care
Insurance Coverage
A product not yet on the market is an integrated life annuity and long-term
care insurance coverage, yet integration has the potential to remedy many
of the problems just described in the life annuity and long-term care insur-
ance markets. Moreover, encouragement of private life annuities and long-
term care insurance may reduce the demand for long-term care financed
out-of-pocket or via public programs.
The Theoretical Issues
On theoretical grounds, a fairly priced life annuity with extra benefits pay-
able following the onset of disability would be consistent with the preferences
of many households (Pauly ∞ΩΩ≠). On practical grounds, the integration of
the two components would appear to be reinforcing. The life annuity would
no longer be seen as quite so illiquid because a major source of uncertainty,
long-term care expenses, could be covered with the integrated product. The
argument that the life annuity is unresponsive to a bequest motive would also
be mitigated, because the long-term care insurance component would
hedge parents’ nonannuitized assets against the risk of long-term care ex-
penses borne by the estate to be inherited by children. Further, postponing
decisions about long-term care insurance until retirement, when households
are better able and more willing to consider the options available to them,
could solve the reluctance problem. Finally, aversion to long-term care insur-
ance would be counterbalanced by tying it to the purchase of a life annuity,
whose payoff, in contrast to a long-term care insurance, would be largest
when the annuitant lived a long (and often healthy) life.
Empirical Evidence on an Integrated Product
Murtaugh et al. (≤≠≠≠) evaluate an integrated product using data from the
∞Ω∫∏ National Mortality Followback Survey (NMFS) projected to represent
hypothetical purchasing pools at age ∏∑ and π∑ in ∞ΩΩ∑. They simulate the
number of people eligible to purchase a combined product with minimal
medical underwriting for the disability benefit, and also the number of
people eligible to purchase LTC insurance and most likely to purchase a life
annuity, sold as stand-alone products. Premiums are completed for the com-
bined product and for stand-alone products. ‘‘Minimal’’ underwriting is
defined as allowing all individuals to purchase the combined product ex-
cept those who would be immediately able to make a claim, that is, those
already significantly disabled.
The first integrated product modeled is a fixed life annuity with payments
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that increase on the determination of a chronic disability. More specifically,
the basic product is a life annuity that pays $∞,≠≠≠ a month for life with a
guaranteed ∞≠-year minimum payout, combined with a disability annuity
that pays an additional $≤,≠≠≠ a month if the purchaser becomes chronically
disabled in at least two activities of daily living (ADLs) or cognitively im-
paired; and an additional $∞,≠≠≠ a month if the purchaser becomes disabled
in four ADLs. Premiums are also estimated for a product having annually
increasing benefits: three percent for the life annuity segment and five
percent for the LTC insurance segment. Small loads are added to cover
administrative (but not marketing) costs; the assumed discount rate used in
pricing is six percent. Benefit amounts are chosen to be such that, com-
bined with social security, they would cover both basic consumption needs
and the cost of nursing home care in most geographic regions, for those
with the greatest level of disability. Charges for both the life annuity and
LTC disability insurance are estimated as a single premium paid at pur-
chase. Premiums for LTC insurance currently are typically level premiums
paid monthly or quarterly. This practice makes the timing of eligibility for
LTC benefits of prospective purchasers more important, since it affects the
amount of prefunding through premium accumulations. For comparability
in this analysis, all premiums were modeled as lump sums paid at purchase.
Access and prospective purchasers. The evidence shows that minimal under-
writing dramatically increases the pool of eligible purchasers from ππ per-
cent under current underwriting practice to Ω∫ percent of persons at age ∏∑.
This expansion has relatively modest impacts on mean risk and expected
duration of disability in the prospective purchaser pool under minimal
underwriting, but it reduces average survival by ∞.∑ years. The relatively
small difference in risk and duration of disability between the purchaser
pools is consistent with the positive relationship between age and disability,
and with previous research showing that expected nursing home use among
those who would be accepted for LTC insurance at age ∏∑ was higher than
for most groups excluded by underwriting (Murtaugh et al. ∞ΩΩ∑). The key
to the higher annual LTC insurance premiums for the excluded groups was
the lack of adequate prefunding of benefit costs, because their service use
was more likely to happen in the near term. This pattern also applies to the
onset of disability, with prospective purchasers of LTC insurance under
current strict underwriting who ultimately become eligible for benefits
doing so ∞π years in the future, compared with generally ∞≠ years or less for
the excluded groups.
Nonpurchasers under current underwriting practice are found to differ
from eligible purchasers primarily in mean survival time, which is just under
∞≤ years, compared with ∞Ω.∑ years for currently eligible purchasers. Risk
and expected duration of disability are similar to that of currently eligible
purchasers. In contrast, minimal underwriting excludes persons whose sur-
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Table 2. Long-Term Care Premiums at Age ∏∑ for Income Annuity with Disability Benefits,
Current Underwriting Versus Minimal Underwriting
$∞,≠≠≠ mo.
Life Annuity
only
$≤,≠≠≠ mo. ≤+
ADL Disability
Benefit
$∞,≠≠≠ mo. ∂+
ADL Disability
Benefit
Combined
Premium
Without inflation protection
All Persons $∞≥Ω,≠Ω∫ $ ∞∑,Ω∑≠ $ ≥,∞∑∑ $∞∑∫,≤≠≥
Prospective purchasers
Current LTC Underwriting $∞∂∑,≠∂∞ $ ∞≥,Ω≠≠ $ ≤,∫∂≥ $∞∏∞,π∫∂
Minimal Underwriting Only $∞≥Ω,∫≤π $ ∞≥,π≤≥ $ ≤,πππ $∞∑∏,≥≤∏
Nonpurchasers
Current LTC Underwriting $∞∞Ω,≠∑∞ $ ≤≤,∫∏∏ $ ∂,≤≠π $∞∂∏,∞≤∂
Minimal Underwriting Only $∞≠∂,∞∂π $∞≤≤,π∏∂ $ ≤∞,≤Ω≥ $≤∂∫,≤≠≥
With inflation protection*
All Persons $∞ππ,≤≥∫ $ ≥∑,∏∂Ω $ π,∏≥≠ $≤≤≠,∑∞π
Prospective purchasers
Current LTC Underwriting $∞∫π,∞≠≤ $ ≥∑,≤∑∫ $ π,πΩ∞ $≤≥≠,∞∑∞
Minimal Underwriting Only $∞π∫,∂≤∏ $ ≥≥,∞≤≤ $ π,≤≤≠ $≤∞∫,π∏∫
Nonpurchasers
Current LTC Underwriting $∞∂≥,Ω∏≥ $ ≥∏,Ω∏Ω $ π,≠∫∏ $∞∫∫,≠∞∫
Minimal Underwriting only $∞≤≠,≤∏∫ $∞∑∏,∫∏∂ $ ≤π,≤Ω∑ $≥≠∂,∂≤π
Source: Murtaugh, Spillman, and Warshawsky (≤≠≠≠).
Note: Base income annuity policy is $∞,≠≠≠ per month for life with a minimum ∞≠-year benefit.
* Income annuity inflates at ≥ percent per year compounded, and disability benefits inflate at ∑ percent
per year compounded, consistent with long term care insurance industry standard for inflation
protection.
vival is only six years on average and whose expected duration of disability is
about four times that of prospective purchasers.
Premium estimates. Table ≤ shows individual premium estimates for three
levels of benefit and a combined premium for the ‘‘at risk’’ populations just
described. Estimates in the top panel assume no annual increase in benefits,
while those in the lower panel include annual increases meant to provide
protection against likely future rates of inflation. The life annuity premium
of $∞≥Ω,∫≤π for the expanded purchaser pool under minimal underwriting
is ≥.∏ percent lower than that for likely purchasers under current practice,
because of the expanded pool’s lower average survival.∞≤ The premium for
disability benefits, like risk and duration of disability, are similar for the two
purchase groups. This is because minimal underwriting excludes two per-
cent of persons representing the worst disability cost risks, and the remain-
ing ‘‘poor risks’’ actually have lower disability costs than those currently
accepted for LTC insurance; the inclusion of these risks reduces the average
premium for the expanded pool. Combined with the lower annuity costs of
prospective purchasers under minimal underwriting, the premium for the
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combined product is $∞∑∏,≥≤∏, about ≥.∂ percent lower than that for stand-
alone life annuity and equivalent long term care insurance products under
current underwriting practice.
This pattern is similar when inflation protection is added, in the lower
panel of Table ≤, but differences are larger because of the greater impact of
the inflation protection on both life annuity and long-term care benefits
received farther in the future by prospective purchasers under current un-
derwriting practice. In particular, this can be seen in the premium for insur-
ance coverage with minimal underwriting, against two-ADL disability, which
is $≥≥,∞≤≤, or six percent lower than under current practice. With inflation
protection, the premium for the combined benefits for the expanded pool
is about five percent below the premium for the standalone products under
current underwriting practice.
A key question is whether the combined product would be attractive to
those groups currently excluded from purchasing LTC insurance and un-
likely to buy a life annuity. Combining LTC insurance coverage with the life
annuity improves the ratio of expected benefits to premium costs for all ‘‘at-
risk’’ groups in the population, in some cases significantly so. Including a
minimum annuity benefit, or guaranteed period, contributes to this result,
as would allowance for some ‘‘ADL creep’’ in the presentation of reported
disability among those insured, and flexibility in the offered mix of life
annuity and LTC insurance benefits. Nevertheless, the ratio of expected
benefits to premium costs is below one for most groups and hence some
perceived insurance value will be needed to elicit purchases.
Potential Markets
Life annuities and long-term care insurance are potentially relevant for
most retirement age persons. It must be recognized, however, that a com-
bined long-term care insurance/life annuity may not appeal to two socio-
economic groups: the poor and the wealthy. Those with the lowest income
and assets are likely to qualify for medical assistance through Medicaid if
they need long-term care, particularly nursing home care, and they are
unlikely to have income from pensions or accumulated assets with which to
purchase private long-term care insurance or annuities. By contrast, and
almost by definition, wealthy persons have more than sufficient assets to
cover almost all length of life and disability contingencies. Excluding these
two groups, however, most retired persons face a risk of outliving their
assets, and nursing home and home care costs represent major threats to
financial security. For the most part, these persons have incentives to avoid
Medicaid eligibility because nonhousing assets must be exhausted, the
choice of LTC providers often is limited, and there is greater risk of poor
quality of care; for some individuals, their income may be too high to qualify
for Medicaid eligibility in some states.
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There are several potential markets where a combined product could be
offered. The most obvious and largest is the retirement product market,
which includes both employer-sponsored pension plans (defined benefit
and defined contribution) and individual retirement accounts. The com-
bined product could also be made available as a distribution option for
another huge market, after-tax annuities (deferred and immediate, fixed
and variable).
Current Product Developments
Several insurance companies in the United States and the United Kingdom
have begun marketing products combining an annuity with a long-term
care rider. All these products have the feature that LTC underwriting is
eliminated or substantially reduced; most employ after-tax deferred variable
annuities as the base product. The combined products vary considerably,
however, in the waiting periods imposed to become eligible for LTC bene-
fits. Only one company has a product where benefits are triggered by dis-
ability as opposed to incurred expenses, and whose LTC insurance is con-
nected with an immediate life annuity as opposed to an accumulating (that
is, deferred) annuity. Hence the integrated product we are examining is
unique and not yet available in the marketplace.
Public Policy and Product Design Issues
Although it might be possible to introduce an integrated long-term care
insurance policy and life annuity in the current environment, there are
legal and product design issues that would have to be dealt with before the
product could be offered in its most desirable form.
Tax Environment
The recent enactment in ∞ΩΩ∏ of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) clarified the tax treatment of long-term care ben-
efits and premiums, providing that LTC expenses and insurance premiums
can be treated like medical expenses with respect to the individual income
tax. Accordingly, LTC expenses are now deductible from federal income
taxes, provided that the expenses exceed π.∑ percent of adjusted gross in-
come. HIPAA also allows individuals to deduct long-term care insurance
premiums up to certain limits based on age, again provided that medical
expenses and premiums exceed π.∑ percent of income; single-premium
LTC policies, however, are not deductible.∞≥ It also stipulates that benefits
payable under a tax qualified LTC policy will not be treated as taxable
income, provided that the policy needs certain benefit trigger and other
design conditions stated in the law. In addition, HIPAA provides employers
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with a tax incentive if they elect to pay some or all of the LTC insurance
premiums for employees. Employees also benefit from this provision, as
their employer’s contribution is not included in the taxable income of the
employee.
One possible logical approach to taxing the integrated product would
break the combined long-term care annuity into its competent life annuity
and single-premium long-term care insurance policy. The purchase of the
insurance policy would presumbly represent a taxable distribution from the
qualified retirement plant. The single premium for that policy would not be
deductible from the taxable income of the plan participant, but the benefits
paid under the policy would not be taxable. The life annuity component
would be gradually taxable when periodic payments are made from the
retirement plan.
An alternative environment for the integrated product. A more favorable en-
vironment would be one where the ‘‘purchase’’ of long-term care insurance
was not considered a taxable distribution and the long-term care benefits
paid from the plan, like accident and sickness benefits paid from an insur-
ance policy, would be excluded from taxable income. This could be ra-
tionalized by analogy with section ∂≠∞(h) of the Internal Revenue Code
permitting tax qualified status for health plans for retired employees, Em-
ployer contributions to pay faor such benefits are not taxable income to the
employee, and the benefits, when received, are also not included in retiree
taxable income. Long-term care benefits can probably be considered health
benefits for the purpose of ∂≠∞(h). There are strict conditions imposed on
benefits provided through ∂≠∞(h), including the necessity to establish a
separate account where the employer’s contributions are collected; ∂≠∞(h)
was added to the Code in ∞Ω∏∂ in response to conditions in certain defined
benefit plans. It is unlikely that the long-term care annuity we are envision-
ing here could meet these conditions, but the precedent of the ∂≠∞(h) law
could allow legislators to craft new provisions that would fit the long-term
care annuity option.∞∂
Indemnity Versus Cash Disability Approach
Most of the administrative considerations pertinent to the integrated LTC
annuity are not unique to the integrated product, but rather affect its com-
ponent parts, that is, the life annuity or the long-term care benefits. Indeed,
our choice of focusing on a disability rather than an indemnity approach to
long-term care insurance benefits presents some special administrative is-
sues, both positive and negative.
In an indemnity approach to long-term care insurance, the claims pro-
cedure is often quite complicated for the insurer to administer. Insured
expenses must be carefully defined in the policy, and claims for reimburse-
ment must be examined in some detail. Furthermore, the insured must
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establish a process of dispute adjudication as well as a system for tracking
limits or maximums. There is also a tendency for insurance companies to
get involved in case management, which can be quite complex and sensitive.
Because an indemnity approach must specify covered benefits, it is not
dynamically flexible, that is, as new treatment methods and modalities arise,
the indemnity policy becomes outdated and must be modified either by
rider or by replacement. In contrast, the disability approach has a much
simpler claims process to administer and it is dynamically flexible. Because
benefits are paid as long as the insured is disabled, regardless of the specific
expenses incurred, if any, the only determination necessary is whether and
when the disabled insured meets certain specified criteria. Finally, the dis-
ability approach is much less prescriptive; it allows, indeed encourages, the
insured to consider carefully how best to use the policy benefits being paid
to meet his needs.
In both the indemnity and the disability approaches to LTC insurance,
disability must be assessed before benefits can be paid and periodically after
payments thereafter, but in the disability approach this determination is
more critical. There will be an incentive for some insured individuals to
claim that they have a disability in order to collect the benefits. It would
therefore seem to be preferable for the disability assessments to be done by
a trusted third-party organization, evaluating for the presence of a combina-
tion of highly objective and well-understood criteria. Criteria for determin-
ing whether individuals meet disability thresholds have been successfully
developed in both private and public sectors, and they are being admin-
istered by nurses, social workers, and other professionals. A few insurance
companies sell disability-based long-term care insurance policies. State gov-
ernment agencies administer benefit programs for the elderly providing
services solely based on the determination of disability.∞∑
The disability approach might be more open to abuse by the insureds and
their relatives or guardians, though it is unknown how extensive this prob-
lem is or would be. Any insurance policy can lead to greater utilization of
(that is, induced demand for) the policy benefit, but in the indemnity
approach cost-sharing features are typically introduced to minimize the
problem. Perhaps an inability to include cost-sharing features explains the
higher premium charged by the few companies utilizing the disability ap-
proach for essentially the same level of benefits as those companies using
the indemnity approach. Even in the disability approach, of course, it may
be possible to include benefit maximums and other design features that give
policyholders incentives to consume their benefits appropriately.
Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter describes current life annuity and long-term care insurance
markets and explores why these products are not widely used. To solve many
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of the problems identified, we suggest integrating the life annuity and long-
term care insurance and review how this would operate. The tax treatment
of this combination could be improved, and product design issues must be
considered carefully. Furthermore, additional research is required to look
at more recent data and different permutations of the product as well as
more refined analysis of the population groups who might utilize it. A favor-
able public policy environment, including tax and insurance regulation, is
needed to encourage this innovation, and insurance companies must be
creative in exploring the possibility of improving the financial security of
current and future retirees.
Notes
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authors.
∞. A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that stimulates a defined contribu-
tion plan; account balances are created for each worker and are credited with a fixed
rate of return. See Rappaport et al. (∞ΩΩπ).
≤. Inflation-indexed annuities do, however, exist in the United Kingdom and a few
other countries; see Brown et al. (this volume; ≤≠≠∞).
≥. This section draws on Warshawsky, Granza, and Madamba (≤≠≠≠).
∂. These statistics exclude LTC provided by hospital-affiliated facilities and agen-
cies, which amounted to over $∞π billion in ∞ΩΩ∏.
∑. Medicare also pays for long-term care for the terminally ill through hospice
care.
∏. Based on data from ∞Ω∫∑, ∂∂ percent of persons who use nursing homes after
age ∏∑ start and end as private payers, ≤π percent start and end as recipients of
Medicaid benefits, and ∞∂ percent spend down assets to become eligible for Medic-
aid benefits (Spillman and Kemper ∞ΩΩ∑). A ∞ΩΩ∑ projection found that ∞π percent
of those turning ∏∑ in ∞ΩΩ∑ would enter a nursing home and remain private payers
throughout, ∏.≥ percent would enter as private payers but become Medicaid eligible
by exhausting their assets, and ∞≠.π percent (three in five of those ending up in a
nursing home on Medicaid) would already be Medicaid eligible on entry.
π. Some have claimed that there is wide scope for evading the rules requiring the
use of assets to pay for nursing home care before the utilization of Medicaid, al-
though there is no formal evidence supporting or denying this assertion.
∫. For a description of the benefits typically offered in long-term care insurance
policies, see Granza, Madamba, and Warshawsky (∞ΩΩ∫).
Ω. Pauly also notes that when Medicaid spending is low but the desired level of care
is an increasing function of wealth, there may be some scope for LTC insurance to
cover the difference between the desired and fixed levels of care. But under current
law Medicaid pays nothing if an individual has LTC insurance, so insurance would be
purchased only if the individual highly valued additional quality of care; presumably
this would be more likely when the individual is starting retirement with a relatively
high standard of living.
∞≠. The Pauly analysis also implies the desirability of LTC insurance with high
deductibles or insurance purchased at relatively advanced ages. This is moderated in
the presence of a spouse and children. For example, if the death of the spouse did
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not affect income and LTC costs are less than the present value of the future con-
sumption had the person survived (which is likely, given the positive correlation of
LTC disability and mortality), then LTC insurance for both lives might not be worth-
while. If, further, children are able to provide care to their disabled parents, and if
parents prefer care from their children over care from others, children might en-
courage the early admission or treatment of their parent.
∞∞. Of course there is significant intertemporal uncertainty about future cost of a
nursing home, that may be uninsurable in private markets (Cutler ∞ΩΩ≥). Private
insurers can pool cross-section risk, but not aggregate risk (especially if the serial
correlation over time of LTC cost increases). In this environment insurance com-
panies may not be able to pool across cohorts as they do in the catastrophe insurance
line of business. In practice, LTC insurance policies sold in the marketplace tend to
pay a fixed dollar amount for care, use nominal rules to update payments over time,
and reserve the right to increase rates in response to adverse cost shocks. These
limitations, combined with benefit maximums found in many policies, reduce the
risk-sharing features of LTC insurance, and hence curtail the demand for it. Com-
bined with commissions and other marketing expenses, these features may imply
that consumers simply view LTC insurance as providing an expected value less than
the actual cost of the policy; see also Sloan and Norton (∞ΩΩπ).
∞≤. This reduction in the cost of adverse selection is below the ∞≠ percent estimate
of the cost of adverse selection cited earlier in the current annuity market. The
difference is in part due to the ∞≠-year minimum benefit in these estimates, which
increases life annuity benefits disproportionately among groups excluded from the
prospective purchaser pool under current practice because of their shorter survival.
The straight life annuities on which the ∞≠ percent estimate of the cost of adverse
selection was based did not include a minimum benefit. For more direct compari-
son, Murtaugh, Spillman, and Warshawsky (≤≠≠≠) indicate that the cost of adverse
selection in their life income annuity with no minimum benefit would be about six
percent. Moreover, the NMFS database is meant to be representative of the entire
U.S. population, whereas purchasers of life annuities and LTC insurance are more
likely to come from population of higher socioeconomic status, who have higher life
expectancies than average.
∞≥. The Long-Term Care and Retirement Security Act of ≤≠≠≠, a bill introduced in
March ≤≠≠≠ by Senators Grassley and Graham, would give individuals an above-the-
line tax deduction for the cost of their qualified LTC insurance policy, subject to the
age-based deduction levels that currently exist. The bill would also allow employers
to include the deduction provision in cafeteria plans and flexible spending accounts.
∞∂. Another tax issue is the relatively unfavorable treatment of long-term care
reserves within the life insurance company as compared to qualified retirement plan
reserves. Previously qualified plan reserves held by life insurance companies were
not afforded favorable treatment, but when employers began to establish trusts for
their pension plans, putting life insurance companies at a competitive disadvantage,
Congress changed the tax treatment. It is possible that the establishment by em-
ployers of ∂≠∞(h) accounts to fund long-term care benefits would result in similar
pressure on Congress to change the tax treatment of long-term care reserves. Pauly
(∞Ω∫Ω) argues that there is a basis for public policy encouragement of private long-
term care insurance, where the optimal subsidy would be higher for low wealth
people. He also argues that a subsidy should be extended as far up the income
distribution as there is positive expected value of Medicaid payments; such a subsidy
will induce the purchase of insurance.
∞∑. Nyman (∞ΩΩΩ) speculates that the widespread existence of health insurance
contracts using the indemnity approach may be explained by a smaller welfare loss
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realized from the purchased-price effect than the welfare loss realized from the
expected fraud and fraud avoidance measures or from writing complex contracts
when the cash disability approach is used. The choice among approaches in any
particular situation is ultimately based on experience, empirical evidence, and intu-
ition regarding the relative magnitudes of these welfare losses.
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